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Abstract 
A series of monte carlo studies were performed to 
compare the behavior of some alternative 
procedures for reasoning under uncertainty. The 
behavior of several Bayesian, linear model and 
default reasoning procedures were examined in the 
context of increasing levels of calibration error. 
The most interesting result is that Bayesian 
procedures tended to output more extreme 
posterior belief values (posterior beliefs near 0.0 
or 1.0) than other techniques, but the linear 
models were relatively less likely to output 
strong support for an erroneous conclusion. 
Also, accounting for the probabilistic 
dependencies between evidence items was 
important for both Bayesian and linear updating 
procedures. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Reasoning under uncertainty often involves a great deal of 
judgmental imprecision. The subjective (or data base 
retrieved) uncertainty estimates that serve as ingredients of 
an uncertainty calculus are often perceived as arbitrary, 
imprecise or uncertain. One consequence of this 
judgmental imprecision is that many decision makers (and 
researchers) avoid using an explicit uncertainty calculus 
for fear of being subject to a garbage in-garbage out 
problem. In this paper this problem is examined by 
studying the extent to which several different inference 
procedures are robustly accurate in the context of 
increasing levels of judgmental imprecision. This paper 
updates the preliminary report found in Lehner (1990). 
2 METHOD 
A series of monte carlo studies were performed in which 
we iterated through the following steps. 
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Generate "True" Probabilities - Each run involves an 
inference problem with one hypothesis (H) node, and 
either four or seven evidence nodes (A-G). Each node is 
hi-valued. A "true" probability distribution 1 is defmed by 
randomly assigning (from 0-1 uniform distribution) a 
value to each instance of P(H=T), P(A=TIH), P(B=TIHA), 
P(C=TIHAB), etc.2 
Assigning Belief Values - For each probability 
distribution, a distribution of belief values was generated 
by adding random error to the true probabilities. For the 
runs reported in this paper all the error distributions were 
uniform. Specifically, 
B(xly) = min+ (max-min)*RND, 
where 
min = maximum[O.O,P(xly)-(range/2)] 
max= minimum[I.O,P(xly)+(range/2)]. 
Here P(xly) is the true conditional probability, B(xly) is 
the belief value that is obtained by adding random error to 
the true probability, RND is a random number and "range" 
is the range of the error distribution, which we call the 
error range. When error range = 0.0, the belief values 
equal the true probabilities. When error range = 2.0, there 
is no correlation between the true probabilities and the 
belief values. Our simulation runs used error ranges in 
the set { 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 
2.0). 
No matter what the error range, the belief values define a 
fully-specified and coherent distribution. The inputs to 
1 As noted in Lehner (1990) calibration error can be defined without 
relying the concept of a true probability. Our use of the tenn "true" is 
merely a convenience. 
2 A notational note. An expression such P(A=TIH=T &BC) is a 
template for a set of expressions. In this case, 
P(A=11H=T,B=T,C=T), P(A=TIH=T,B=T,C=F), ... are instances of this 
template. 
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each of the inference procedures were derived from this 
underlying distribution of belief values. 
Inference Procedures - A  variety of inference procedures 
were examined. Each inference procedure prescribes a 
mechanism for evaluating evidence to generate a posterior 
belief value. For example, in Bayesian inference the 
posterior belief in H=T given A=F, B=T, C=T and D=T 
(i.e., PB(H=TIA=F B=T C=T D=T)) is determined by 
Bayes rule, whereas the linear models calculate this by a 
weighted sum of evidence items that support or contradict 
H=T. The specific inference procedures are described 
individually in the results section. 
Empirical Evaluation - For each inference procedure we 
recorded the distribution of posterior belief values for H=T 
and H=F. Table 1 gives a typical example using the 
procedure Proper Bayes. Consider the first cell in this 
table. It indicates that when error range = 0.0, the 
expected probability that the posterior belief in H=T is 
less than .11 when in fact H=T is .068. That is 
P(PB(H=T)<.l liH= T)=.068. 
In addition, we also calculated normalized difference 
between the means ( d') between the distributions 
P(PB(H=T)IH=F) and P(PB(H=T)IH=T). This provides an 
estimate of the extent to which the inference procedure 
differentiates between the H=T and H=F condition. 
Analytical Evaluation - After each monte carlo run we 
performed an analytical evaluation to explain the results 
and to identify the extent to which the results are likely to 
generalize. These analyses were used to design the each 
new monte carlo run. Rather than execute a series of 
undirected simulations, each monte carlo run was designed 
to address a question that the previous analysis left 
unanswered. 
3 RESULTS 
Presented below are the principal results of this study. 
3. 1 BAYESIAN UPDATING 
Bayesianism is a school of thought that argues that a 
rational system of belief values should conform to the 
probability calculus and that Bayes rule should be the 
mechanism by which posterior beliefs are calculated (e.g., 
Pearl, 1988). In Bayesian theory posterior belief values 
should be conditioned on all available evidence and all 
probabilistic interactions among those evidence items 
should be taken into account. In practice it is often 
necessary to implement simplified Bayesian procedures 
that ignore some of the interactions between evidence 
items. In this study we examined the theoretically correct 
and two simplified Bayesian procedures. 
3. 1. 1 Proper Bayes 
Here we used Bayes rule properly. For instance, in the 
four evidence case for each evidential state 
PB(H=TIABCD) = 
LB(H=T & ABCD)/LB(HABCD) 
Table 1 shows the results for three error ranges. Note the 
shape of the distributions. Proper Bayesian updating 
consistently resulted in a U-shaped distribution of 
posterior belief values. This indicates that when H=T, 
Bayesian updating is more likely to derive an extreme 
posterior belief value (less than .11) in the wrong 
direction than an intermediate value (between .44 and .56). 
The results for H=F are symmetric and are not reported 
separately. 
It is also worth noting that as the error range increased, 
the proportion of posterior belief values in the middle 
range (between .33 and .67) did not change substantially. 
The suggests that proper Bayesian conditioning 
consistently outputs strong support for some conclusion, 
and that input error tends to increase the probability that 
the output values will show strong support for the wrong 
conclusion. 
The U-shaped nature of the posterior belief curve can be 
accounted for by the fact that Bayesian conditioning is a 
multiplicative rule applied to likelihood ratios. Whenever 
the input belief values are very small, there is considerable 
potential for significant error. We tested this hypothesis 
by forcing belief values to lie between .05 and .95, and 
rerunning the simulation. As shown in Table 2, this did 
have the effect of smoothing out the tail, but as the error 
range increased the U-shape reappeared. 
3.1.2 Naive Bayes 
One way to simplify the application of Bayesian inference 
is to treat the evidence items as though they are 
conditionally independent of each other. Bayesian models 
of this type are often called Naive Bayesian models. 
Although recognized as a simplification, this approach 
does make it easier to apply Bayesian procedures to a large 
variety of inference problems (e.g., Edwards, et.al., 1968). 
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Table 1 :  Average Probability of Posterior Belief Values for 
Proper Bayes 
Posterior Four Evidence Items 
Belief 0.00 0.40 1.20 
.00·.11 .068 .075 .151 
.11-.22 .050 .055 .082 
.22-.33 .048 .053 .071 
.33-.44 .049 .052 .063 
.44-.56 .053 .057 .066 
.56-.67 .063 .066 .072 
.67-.78 .080 .087 .083 
.78-.89 .122 .127 .114 
.89-1.0 .467 .428 .298 
d' 1.00 0.88 0.32 
In our study, we examined two forms of naive Bayesian 
updating. In both cases we used the marginal probability 
of each evidence item given H= T and H=F to calculate 
posterior belief. In the case of Simple Naive Bayes, all 
evidence items were used to calculate posterior belief 
values. For Strong Naive Bayes posterior belief was 
calculated in the same way except that for any evidence 
item x, if 2/3 < B(xiH=T)/B(xiH=F) < 3/2 then x was 
dropped from the calculation (i.e., likelihood ratio set to 
1). 
Table 3 shows the results for some of the Simple Naive 
Bayes runs. The Strong Naive Bayes results were nearly 
identical and are not reported separately. In general, the 
pattern of results were the same as with Proper Bayes, but 
the differentiation between the two distributions was 
considerably less. This is reflected in the lower d' values. 
Surprisingly, when there are seven evidence items, the 
distribution of belief values remained almost the same. 
The d' values for Simple Naive Bayes were .68, .60 and 
.21 which are close to the d' values in Table 3. 
Table 2: Average Probability of Posterior 
Belief Values for Proper Bayes When 
Extreme Belief Values Are Suppressed 
Posterior Four Evidence Items 
Belief 0.00 0.40 1.20 
.00-. 1 1  .046 .053 . 116 
.11-.22 .053 .058 .091 
.22-.33 .053 .057 .080 
.33-.44 . 056 .059 .075 
.44-.56 .062 .065 .077 
.56-.67 .075 .077 .084 
.67-.78 .094 .098 .097 
.78-.89 .146 . 145 .131 
.89-1.0 .414 .387 .249 
d 1.02 0.91 0.34 
Seven 
0.00 
.047 
.031 
.029 
.030 
.033 
.039 
.054 
.088 
.650 
1.61 
Evidence 
0.40 
.058 
.037 
.035 
.034 
.039 
.046 
.060 
.097 
.593 
1.34 
3.2 LINEAR MODELS 
Items 
1.20 
.159 
.065 
.052 
.049 
.051 
.056 
.068 
.100 
.399 
.046 
In the judgment and decision making (JDM) research 
literature there is a tradition of research that focuses on the 
use of linear models to predict human judgment (see 
Dawes, 1979 for review; Levi, 1989 for recent example). 
This work is based on two rather surprising but reliable 
results. First, in probabilistic domains, linear models are 
often good predictors of human judgment. Even for tasks 
that appear to be fundamentally pattern-based (e.g., 
clinical judgment), a regression model of an expert's 
judgments is usually a good predictor of that expert's 
future judgments. Second, linear models of expert 
judgment usually perform better than the experts from 
which they were derived. This result even holds for linear 
models with improper equal-weights. 
Here we examined three types of linear models. 
Complex Linear. This technique simply adds up pros and 
cons and normalizes the result to the number of possible 
evidence items. A pro was defined as any evidence item for 
which the conditional probability of that evidence item 
given the hypothesis and other evidence items was greater 
than one. For instance, for the evidential state A=T, B=F, 
C=T and D=T, evidence item "C=T" was considered a pro 
if 
B(C=TIH=T, A=T, B=F) 
---------------------------------- > 1.0 
B(C=TIH=F, A=T, B=F) . 
Simple Linear. Same as Complex Liner except that the 
conditional dependencies between evidence items was 
ignored. For instance, in the above example "C=T" was 
counted as a pro if 
B(C=TIH=T)/B(C=T/H=F) > 1.0. 
Strong Linear. This is exactly the same as Simple Linear 
except that we did not count an item as a pro or con if the 
ratio was near 1 (specifically in the range 2/3 to 3/2). 
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Table 3: Average Probability of Posterior Belief Values for 
Simple Naive Bayes 
Posterior Four Evidence Items Seven Evidence Items 
Belief 0.00 0.40 1.20 0.00 0.40 1 .20 
.00-.11 .091 .091 .131 
.11-.22 .070 .076 .095 
.22-.33 .066 .069 .088 
.33-.44 .066 .070 .085 
.44-.56 .070 .074 .086 
.56-.67 .080 .085 .089 
.67-.78 .097 .102 .101 
.78-.89 .137 .139 .122 
.89-1.0 .321 .294 .203 
d' 0.60 0.54 0.19 
Weighted Linear. This was the same as Simple Linear 
except that a weighting scheme was attached that increased 
the weight on a pro or con as the likelihood ratios deviated 
from I. 
Tables 4 and 5 show some of the results for the Complex 
and Simple Linear procedures. The .000 values in some 
of the cells is an artifact of the limited number of evidence 
items, so some posterior belief values are logically 
impossible. The pattern of results for the Strong Linear 
and Weighted Linear procedures were similar to that of 
Simple Linear and are not reported separately. Note that 
the distributions of posterior beliefs are now single peaked 
and that strong support for either conclusion is rarely 
observed. This conservatism is even more apparent when 
the number of evidence items increases. This reflects the 
inherent conservatism of an additive versus a 
multiplicative inference procedure. 
.090 .090 .138 
.068 .071 .094 
.060 .070 .085 
.065 .071 .081 
.067 .075 .082 
.073 .082 .085 
.090 .098 .099 
.131 .139 .123 
.356 .304 .212 
0.68 0.60 0.21 
On the other hand, when the linear procedure does output 
strong support for some conclusion it is generally more 
discriminating than the Bayesian procedures. This is 
shown in Table 6 which shows the likelihood ratio of 
posterior belief give H=T vs. H=F. Except for the middle 
range (.44-.56) where the ratio should be 1.0, the ratio for 
strong linear (indeed all the linear models) was generally 
more extreme than that of the Bayesian models. When 
error range = 0.0, the strong linear model was consistently 
more extreme. This was often true even when we 
compared the linear models that ignored evidential 
interactions to Proper Bayes took account of the 
conditional dependencies between evidence items. 
The d' values reflect the same pattern as the Bayesian 
models. If conditional dependencies between evidence are 
taken into account, then d' improves substantially as the 
number of evidence items increases. If conditional 
dependencies are ignored, then d' remains nearly the same. 
TABLE 4 : Average Probability of Posterior Belief Values for 
Complex Linear 
Posterior Four Evidence Items Seven Evidence Items 
Belief 0.00 0.40 1.20 0.00 0.40 1.20 
.00-.11 .006 .008 .020 .000 .000 .002 
.11-.22 .054 .062 .111 .004 .004 .016 
.22-.33 .000 .000 .000 .023 .026 .067 
.33-.44 .200 .210 .274 .083 .093 .165 
.44-.56 .000 .000 .000 .192 .207 .255 
.56-.67 .347 .343 .337 .283 .283 .262 
.67-.78 .000 .000 .000 .253 .241 .165 
.78-.89 .295 .287 .209 .134 .120 .058 
.89-1.0 .101 .091 .050 .028 .025 .010 
d' 0.89 0.82 0.32 1.23 1.00 0.45 
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TABLE 5: Average Probability of Posterior Belief Values for 
Simple Linear 
Posterior Four Evidence Items Seven Evidence Items 
Belief 0.00 0.40 1.20 0.00 0.40 1 .20 
.00-. l l  .013 .015 .025 .001 .002 .003 
.ll-.22 .084 .090 .131 .014 .015 .025 
.22-.33 .000 .000 .000 .057 .061 .092 
.33-.44 .229 .236 .286 .143 .151 .197 
.44-.56 .000 .000 .000 .232 .238 .263 
.56-.67 .324 .327 .325 .254 .253 .236 
.67-.78 .000 .000 .000 .187 .183 .131 
.78-.89 .263 .250 .188 .089 .080 .045 
.89-1.0 .088 .082 .045 .023 .017 .008 
d' 0.63 0.56 0.19 0.66 0.59 0.19 
TABLE 6: P(PB(H=T)IH=T)/P(P B(H=T)IH=F) 
Four Evidence Nodes 
Error Range = 0.0 Error Range = 1.2 
Posterior Proper Naive Strong Proper Naive Strong 
Belief Bayes Bayes Linear Bayes Bayes Linear 
0.0-.ll 0.145 0.285 0.103 
. l l -.22 0.420 0.521 0.178 
.22-.33 0.596 0.675 0.311 
.33-.44 0.777 0.796 0.567 
.44-.56 0.972 0.980 0.985 
.56-.67 1.280 1.204 1.783 
.67-.78 1.650 1.452 3.119 
.78-.89 2.367 1.920 5.510 
.89-1.0 7.129 3.588 9.953 
3.3 DE FAULT MODELS 
In the AI community there are a number of researchers 
that advocate the use of qualitative/symbolic approaches to 
reasoning under uncertainty. The symbolic approach 
generally involves some form of default reasoning, where 
a system will jump to default conclusion that can be 
retracted later if contradictory evidence surfaces (Reiter, 
1988). 
In our study we examined several default models, all of 
which involved assigning PB(H=T)= l.O if any of the LRs 
exceeded a threshold T and no LRs were less than 1/T; 
PB(H=T)=O.O if the reverse occurs; and PB(H=T)=0.5 
0.517 0.654 0.513 
0.719 0.796 0.558 
0.830 0.844 0.689 
0.882 0.933 0.851 
0.976 1.005 1.001 
1.099 1.064 1.202 
1.208 1.194 1.391 
1.378 1.280 1.761 
1.949 1.498 1.942 
otherwise. In short, it takes only one piece of 
confirmatory evidence to jump to a strong conclusion 
(posterior belief = 1.0 or 0.0), but contradictory evidence 
leaves the system uncertain (posterior belief = 0.5). 
Table 7 shows some of the results for default models 
where T=3/2 and T=5/2. The principal thing to notice 
here are the likelihood ratios of posterior belief. When 
T=3/2, they compare favorably with those generated by 
the Bayesian procedures, particularly the Naive Bayesian 
models. In fact the default procedure, using a very mild 
threshold, was about as discriminating as when the naive 
Bayes outputs strong (>.89 or <.11) posterior belief 
values. 
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Table 7: Average Probability of Posterior Belief Values for Default Models 
Posterior Threshold = 3/2 Threshold = 5/2 
Belief 0.00 0.40 1.20 0.00 0.40 1 .20 
0.0 .098 .110 .165 
0.5 .575 .569 .597 
1.0 .327 .322 .237 
Perhaps more surpnsmg is the fact that when the 
threshold for jumping to a conclusion becomes more 
stringent (increases to T= 5/2) the default reasoning 
system was more likely to jump to a default conclusion, 
but was less likely to be correct when doing so. This 
counter intuitive result is accounted for by the fact that the 
thresholds are symmetric. A stringent threshold implies 
that once a default conclusion has been made, it will take 
a strong piece of evidence to force a retraction of that 
conclusion. With a less stringent threshold a weaker 
evidence item is sufficient to get the system to retract a 
default conclusion. Consequently, with a less stringent 
threshold, the default reasoning system is less likely to 
stick to a default conclusion in the context of 
contradictory evidence. 
4 DISCUSSION 
4.1 ON SCORING RULES 
Before discussing the implications of the above results, 
we need first to address two possible objections to our 
study. First, why did we not use a proper scoring rule 
such as mean squared error (MSE) to evaluate the inference 
procedures? In fact, in our preliminary studies (Lehner, 
1990) we did. However as discussed there the expected 
MSE score for the Bayesian procedures began increased 
rapidly as the error range increased. When the error range 
exceeded 1.0, the expected MSE score for all the Bayesian 
procedures was greater than .25, which is an MSE score 
that can be guaranteed by ignoring all evidence and 
asserting PB(H)=.5 under all conditions. In short, the 
proper scoring rule indicated that in the context of 
significant higher order uncertainty, Bayesian updating 
was worse than useless. 
This result can now be explained by the U-shaped PB 
distribution characteristic of Bayesian inference. Other 
things being equal, squared error rules will tend to 
attribute higher error scores to techniques that tend toward 
extreme PB values. Consequently, despite the fact that 
MSE is a nondistorting scoring rule, it provided a 
misleading evaluation. 
The second objection has to do with the apparent lack of 
calibration of our Proper Bayes result. A careful reader 
might proceed through the following line of thought. 
Consider the error range = 0.0 column in Table 1. If 
indeed correct Bayesian procedures are being applied to true 
.182 .207 .255 
.391 .376 .411 
.426 .417 .334 
probabilities, then the posterior belief values should be 
the true posterior probabilities. This in tum suggests that 
if PB(H=T)>.89, then 
P(PB(H=T)>.891H=T) .89 
P(PB(H=T)>.891H=F) 
> ------ = 8.1 
.1 1  
Yet Table 1 shows a ratio of  only 7.129. Proper Bayes is 
not calibrated, and therefore incorrectly implemented. 
It turns out that the above analysis is wrong, but for a 
subtle and interesting reason. Since error range is 0.0, we 
know that within each run PB(H=TIE) = P(H=TIE). 
Therefore within each run 
P(PB(H=T)=x & H=T) 
here 
=L P(PB(H=T)=x IH=T & E)*P(H=TIE)*P(E) 
E 
x*P(E) 
EIP(H=TIE)=x 
From this we can derive 
P(pBCH-D-xiH-D = EfD'x*P@)/P{H-Dl 
P(PB(H=T)=xiH=F) E[l:((1-x)*P(E))/P(H=F)], 
where E is the expectation across runs and :E sums over 
evidential states (E) within a run where P(H=TIE)=x. 
Now, the values x and P(H=T) are not conditionally 
independent. Across runs, as P(H=T) is high, the 
probability of observing an evidential state where 
P(H=TIE)>.89 decreases. Consequently, one should 
generally expect that 
P<PB<H=D=xiH=D < x*E[p(H=Fl] 
P(PB(H=T)=xiH=F) (1-x)*E[P(H=T)]. 
In our monte carlo runs, E[P(H=T)]=.5, so the observed 
data is consistent with this inequality. 
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4.2 IMPLICATIONS 
Some of the implications of this study are listed below. 
Accounting for evidential interactions is essential - Our 
simulation results support the common belief that 
accounting for interactions between the evidence items is 
essential for effective updating. If interactions are ignored 
then increasing the amount of evidence available did not 
substantially improve the ability of either Bayesian or 
linear updating procedures to discriminate H=T vs. H=F. 
If higher order uncertainty exists, update cautiously -
Bayesian updating tends toward extreme belief values. If 
higher order uncertainty exists, then the probability that 
the posterior values will support an incorrect hypothesis 
increases rapidly. 
Linear updating is accurate, but not very poweiful - The 
results here suggest that simplistic linear update 
procedures (e.g., add up pros and cons), are a reasonably 
accurate approach to reasoning under uncertainty. Relative 
to Bayesian procedures, linear procedures rarely show 
strong support for the wrong hypothesis. There are 
however two provisos. First, interactions between the 
evidence items must be accounted for. Second, the linear 
procedures often do not show strong support for an y 
hypothesis. When this occurs the reasoner should be 
prepared to execute a more powerful technique. 
Default reasoning requires asymmetric thresholds -
Implicit in any default reasoning procedure is a conditional 
probability statement. A knowledge engineer would not 
add a default rule (if a conclude by-default b) unless the 
engineer believed that for the set of applications of the 
system P(bla) was high. Our results suggest that as the 
engineer becomes more conservative in defining defaults 
(i.e., P(bla)>T and T increases) the default reasoning 
system may become more likely to make erroneous 
default conclusions. This is because, once the system has 
made a default conclusion, the conservatism works in 
reverse. The system is less likely to retract that 
conclusion. This suggest that default reasoning systems 
should have asymetric thresholds. Default reasoning 
procedures that jump to tentative conclusions should be 
conservative. Procedures that retract default conclusions 
should be less conservative. 
Perhaps the most interesting question that these results 
suggest is that of the sufficiency of Bayes rule. Consider 
the following case. A probability model has been 
specified that we know reflects true probabilities. Upon 
observing some evidence, E, we apply Proper Bayes and 
deduce PB(H=T)=.9. However, using a Strong Linear 
procedure we deduce PB(H=T)=. l .  If we accept 
PB(H=T)=.9, then we are ignoring the output of the 
inference procedure which we know is, in general, more 
discriminating. On the other hand, to accept a posterior 
value other than .9, is to accept a value which we know to 
be other than the true probability. Furthermore, it 
suggests that there is more information in the evidence 
than coherent updating has extracted. We are currently 
investigating this issue. 
References 
Brier, G. "Verification of forecasts expressed in terms of 
probability," Monthly Weather Review, 1950, 75, 1-3. 
Dawes, R. "The robust beauty of improperly weighted 
linear models," American Psychologist, 1979, 34(7), 571-
582. 
Edwards, W., Phillips, L., Hays, W. and Goodman, B. 
"Probabilistic information processing systems: Design 
and evaluation, IEEE Transactions on Systems Science 
and Cybernetics, 1968, SCC-4, 248-265. 
Lehner, P. "Robust Inference Policies: Preliminary 
Report," Proceedings of the sixth Annual Uncertainty in 
AI Workshop, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
August 1990. 
Levi, K., "Expert systems should be more expert than 
human experts: Evaluation procedures from human 
judgment and decision making," IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 1989, 19(3), 647-657. 
Pearl, J. Probabilistic Reasoning: Networks of Plausible 
Inference, Morgan Kaufmann, 1988. 
Reiter, R. "Nonmonotonic Reasoning," Annual Review 
of Computer Science, 1988. 
